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Direct Democracy and Article II: Additional
Thoughts on Initiatives and Presidential
Elections
by VIKRAM DAVID AMAR*

In this essay, I focus on the first of the two questions Professor
Richard Hasen's graceful and thoughtful essay on whether "initiated
changes to rules for choosing Presidential electors violate Article II."'
Everything Professor Hasen has said on this score is helpful. To the extent2
that I go beyond Professor Hasen's bottom line of equipoise on this issue

and assert (as I do) that Article I should not be read to foreclose (even illadvised) initiative proposals such as California's (now moot) "Presidential
Election Reform Act," 3 it is because I do more of what Professor Hasen has
done in his piece. Namely, I look closely at places other than Article II

where the Constitution uses the phrase "legislature of the States" and
carefully examine Supreme Court cases on the topic. My own plowing of

the ground Professor Hasen stakes out leads me to a firmer conclusion than
the one he ventures.4

. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School
of
Law. A.B., UC Berkeley (1985); J.D., Yale Law School (1988).
1. Richard Hasen, When "Legislature May Mean More than Legislature:" Initiated
ElectoralCollege Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (2008).
2. See generally id.

3. As Professor Hasen points out, the California initiative proposal has apparently failed to
ganer enough signatures to qualify for the ballot. Id. at 606 n.36. The California Secretary of
State's website still lists the initiative as pending, subject to a signature count and verification,
See http://www.sos.ca.gov/. Had the initiative qualified and been passed, I believe it could not
have applied to the 2008 election in any event. Vikram Amar, The So-Called Presidential
Election Reform Act: A ClearAbuse of California'sInitiative Process, FINDLAW, Aug. 17, 2007,

http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/amar/20070817.html.
4. Professor Hasen implies that I have altered my position on this question over the last few
months. See Hasen, supra note 1, at 608 n.46 ("Professor Amar initially took a middle position
as well: 'There is a significant chance the current Court would continue to hold that Article II's
specific reference to state 'legislatures' insulates those legislatures from judicial oversight that
otherwise would be provided for under state law .... These initiatives, too, might be seen by the
Court as impermissibly interfering with the legislature's complete discretion in this area.' In his
[631]
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I. The Virtues of Careful Intratextualism
As Professor Hasen apparently believes, oftentimes interpretation of a
phrase in the Constitution benefits from a comparison of how similar
language elsewhere in the document has been understood. 5 "Legislatures"
of the "States" are authorized (and sometimes required) by the Constitution
to do a variety of things, and Professor Hasen is wise to consult some of
these other areas of the Constitution. In particular, the word "legislature"
(referring to States) appears (in its singular or plural form) outside of
Article II in Article I, Section 4, Article IV, Sections 3 and 4, Article V,
and the Seventeenth Amendment's Section 2.6 But in consulting and
comparing each of these provisions, we must also be sensitive to even
subtle textual differences among them.7
Regarding the question at hand, one such difference is that the
sentence relating to Presidential elections in Article II-where the word
"legislature" appears-is one in which the "State" rather than the
"legislature" is the subject. Article II provides that "each State, shall
appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct" a number of
electors.8 While the institution of the state "legislature" is specifically
mentioned, it is the "State"-a term that might naturally be read to include
the people thereof-that is textually empowered and/or obligated to appoint
electors under the provision. This linguistic feature arguably makes Article
II, Section 2 textually different from others such as Article I, Section 4;

current piece in this symposium, however, he has come to the view that 'Article II should not be
read to foreclose (even ill-advised) initiative measures' reforming a state's system for allocating
Electoral College votes.")
But any perceived difference between my earlier writing on the Presidential Election Reform Act
and the present essay dissolves on a closer reading of my earlier comments. What I wrote last
year was that there was a "significant chance the Court would strike down" the California
measure if it were enacted because the initiative "might be seen by the Court as impermissibly
interfering with the legislature's complete discretion in this area." Vikram David Amar, The SoCall Presidential Election Reform Act: A Clear Abuse of California's Initiative Process,
FINDLAW, Aug. 17, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20070817.html (emphasis added).
My entirely consistent position today is that the Court "should not" do so. My FindLaw analysis
was more predictive than the prescriptive discussion I offer today.
5. "Intratextualism,"-a term I use here-describes the interpretive method by which
similar words or terms in the Constitution are analyzed by reference to each other. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-49, 788-95 (1999). For an extensive
example of intratextualism see Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as PoliticalParticipationAkin
to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
6. Even this list is not exhaustive. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-4, 8; U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§§ 3-4; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3.
7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, supra note 5, 776-77 (noting that sometimes similar words
or series of words contain subtle differences).
8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
2 (emphasis added).
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Article IV, Section 3; and, Article V that textually empower state
"legislatures" only. 9 Similarly, the fact that Section 2 of the Seventeenth
Amendment refers to state "legislatures" in the same sentence that also
refers to state "executive authorit[ies]" textually suggests more specific
delineation of federally delegated duties and powers than would be the case
for those provisions in which the term "legislatures" appears alone.' 0
In addition to noting this intratextual nuance, I might expand my
intratextual scope to include provisions other than Article I, Section 4 and
Article V (on which Professor Hasen devotes his attention). I have already
mentioned the Seventeenth Amendment. But I would also include a look at
the pre-Seventeenth Amendment experience of selecting Senators and the
textual light it sheds on the term "legislature" as used in the original
Constitution.

II. Senate Elections
Article I, Section 3 (later amended by the Seventeenth Amendment in
1913) provides that the "Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof ....
Like Article I, Section 4 and Article V, Article I, Section 3 textually makes
the state legislatures the actors: it is the "Legislature[s] thereof," and not
the "states" more generally, that shall do the "cho[osing]."' 2
For present purposes, I need not fully engage the question whether, as
an originalist matter, "legislature" in Article I, section 3 was intended to

9.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The times, places and manner of holding elections for

Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof."); U.S.

CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("[N]o new states shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any
other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states,
without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress."); U.S.
CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of
the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall
be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures
of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress.").
10. The same would be true for Article IV's so-called "Guarantee Clause," which provides
in relevant part that the federal government shall protect each state against domestic violence "on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See generally Vikram David Amar, Are Statutes Constraining
Gubernatorial Power to Make Temporary Appointments to the United States Senate
Constitutional Under the Seventeenth Amendment?, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (forthcoming).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1,amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
12. Id. Once again, compare this language with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, providing
that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, [the state's
electoral college] Electors." Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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mean "independent standing legislature" or instead could include the
people of a state. 13 Whether they were intended to be guaranteed
independence by the Constitution as originally written or not, state
legislatures did enjoy independence from initiated measures in selecting
their preferred persons for the Senate for the first one hundred years of the
Republic. 14 But state legislative independence had eroded by the late
nineteenth century, 15 well before the formal enactment of the Seventeenth
16
Amendment that concretized direct election.
Beginning in the 1890s and continuing through the early 1900s, the
people of various states were devising increasingly effective ways to limit
state legislators' discretion in their choice of federal Senators. 17 What
evolved into the most sophisticated approach, the so-called "Oregon Plan"
(or Scheme), began simply as an opportunity for state legislative candidates
to formally pledge to follow the will of the voters, as expressed through an
advisory popular election, when it came time to pick the next federal
Senator. 18 The pledges were considered merely moral at first. 19 But as
other states began to follow Oregon's lead, more creative and more
13. There may be some originalist support for this. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at
291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The Senate will be elected absolutely and
exclusively by the State legislatures."). Moreover, as a textual matter, Article I, section 3's use of
"legislature" can be contrasted with Article I, Section 2's use of the term "people thereof' in
providing for U.S. House elections, raising an inference that legislatures should be understood as
distinct from the people who elected them, in the same way that when the term "legislature" is
used next to the term "executive," the Constitution intends to allocate power exclusively between
the two institutions. Yet state peoples create state legislatures in a way that state legislatures do

not create state executives or vice versa, so there is at least a plausible textual/structural argument
that Article I, section 3 merely authorized, as opposed to mandated, states to delegate United
States Senate elections to standing legislatures. See generally, Vikram David Amar, The People
Made Me Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the
Article V ConstitutionalAmendment Process?,41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037 (2000).
14.

C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE

SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT, 16-17, 84-85 (Transaction Publishers 1995).

15. I, along with several other commentators, have written about these events at some
length. For the most thorough of these accounts, see GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF
SENATORS (1906).
See also Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A
StructuralExamination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347 (1996); Roger G.
Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in
Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189 (1987); Kris W. Kobach, Note,
Rethinking Article V. Term Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE
L.J. 1971 (1994); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 201

(1996).
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years .....
17. See Rotunda, supra note 15, at 206-09.
18. Id., at 208-09.
19. Id.
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coercive devices were employed. Nebraska, in fact, pioneered a "scarlet
letter" approach, in which elected legislators who broke the pledge they
took as state legislative candidates were burdened with a ballot notation to
that effect in the event they sought state legislative reelection.2 ° Other
states followed suit, crafting variations on the Oregon and Nebraska
devices to suit their local needs. 2 Oregon voters ultimately adopted a state
constitutional amendment that, as a matter of state law, legally bound state
legislators to select the United States Senate candidates who were most
popular among state voters.2 2 By 1912, when the U.S. Senate approved the
Seventeenth Amendment, nearly sixty percent of the senators were already
selected by some means of direct election (and thus had nothing to fear
from it). 23 For this reason, it seems likely that even without ratification of
the Seventeenth Amendment, direct election would in fact be with us today
in most, if not all, States.24
In reality then, the Seventeenth Amendment was a formalizing final
step in an evolutionary process.
To be sure, the Amendment's
acknowledgment of an already-existing condition has made that condition
more impervious to alteration and has symbolic meaning as well. But it
would be a mistake to minimize the force and effect of state constitutional
law innovations.
Of course, the Oregon state constitutional provision, binding state
legislators, the Nebraska scarlet letter devices, and the somewhat similar
measures from other states were never litigated in the United States
Supreme Court 26 or in lower courts. Yet that fact may itself be telling.
20. See generally HAYNES, supra note 15; Rotunda, supra note 15, at 209.
21. See Rotunda, supra note 15, at 209; Kobach, supra note 15, at 1978-79 & n.33.
22. See Brooks, supra note 15, at 208.
23. Id., at 208-09.
24. Id., at 209.
25. Id., at 206.
26. The Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920), seven years after the
enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, observed that: "It was never suggested, so far as we
are aware, that the purpose of making the office of Senator elective by the people could be
accomplished by a referendum vote. The necessity of the [Seventeenth] Amendment to
accomplish the purpose of popular election is shown in the adoption of the Amendment." A
determination in 1920 that the Oregon Plan was unconstitutional would have sent shock waves
through the country. Moreover, the Hawke Court's reasoning in this dictum is flawed. The
Seventeenth Amendment could have been enacted to clarify the people's (preexisting) power to
elect Senators. Clauses in the Constitution are often inserted for this clarifying effect. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2-7
(1998) (discussing the idea of redundancy as a tool for clarification). Moreover, the Seventeenth
Amendment could merely have changed the "default rule" from legislative to popular election,
even though the people of the state had always enjoyed the right to make this change on a state-

by-state basis on their own.
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And if the Oregon and Nebraska models were indeed unconstitutional,
would that not have meant that all the Senators elected from all the states
that employed such devices for over a decade were illegitimate? The
Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges who were
confirmed by these tainted Senators might also therefore be thought
illegitimate in some sense. Laying to one side the obvious point that there
would be no easy judicial remedy for any such illegality, it seems
implausible to think that anyone in any of the three branches of the federal
government considered the entire federal regime to be ultra vires in this
way for over a decade. Thus, this pre-Seventeenth Amendment history
may be strong historical support for modem direct democracy proponents
on the latitude provided in the term "legislature," at least in Article I,
Section 3.27

III. Other Uses of Similar Language
Two other places in the Constitution where "state legislatures" are
empowered warrant discussion. As noted above, Article I, Section 4 allows
the "legislature" of each state to "prescribe" the "Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives ...,,28 As
Professor Hasen explains, the Supreme Court has held-and I completely
agree-that this clause does not prohibit a state constitution from vesting
reapportionment power in the people of a state acting through their
referendum and initiative powers. 29 Thus, in this clause of the Constitution,
the term "legislature" of a state has not meant "legislature independent of
the people." Finally, Article IV, section 3 provides that no new state shall
be carved out of territory from existing states "without the Consent of the
,30 Although the question does
Legislatures of the States concerned . ...
not seem to have been discussed in case law or literature, I see no
constitutional reason why direct popular consent, or consent through a
special convention, should not suffice to validly cede state property.

27. See Rotunda, supra note 15, at 210. Of course, technically speaking, legislatures-not
the people in lieu of them-were still electing Senators under the Oregon and Nebraska plans,

which is not true for "initiated" measures. But this kind of formalism seems unavailing. Cf
Thornton v. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. 779, 831 (1995) ("Petitioners' argument treats the

Qualifications Clauses not as the embodiment of a grand principle, but rather as empty
formalism.).
1.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 4, cl.
29. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
I.
30. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
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Of course, even a devout "intratextualist" must acknowledge that a
single term like "state legislature" can mean different things in the same
document. 3' For myself, however, these analogies, particularly the Oregon
Plan history, are helpful ones because they refute the simplistic textual
argument that "legislature" has to mean "independent legislature" free from
direct democracy.

IV. (Re)reading the Cases-The Thorny Language in
Hawke v. Smith
As Professor Hasen's article illustrates, the "hardest" case to deal with
for proponents of direct democracy in the Article II setting is Hawke v.
Smith.32 But a careful look at Hawke shows that the troublesome language
used by the Court was unnecessary, and that the Court's result in that case
made eminent sense, even if we embrace direct democracy possibilities. A
closer look is thus in order.
33
The facts of Hawke are rarely presented in modem cases citing it, 34
and indeed are not all apparent from the Supreme Court opinion itself.

31. For example, the term "person" may mean different things in different constitutional
contexts; corporations are persons for purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though they are not persons for purposes of the Census Clause.
32. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 221. Hawke is really the only difficult case for initiative proponents
because it is the only Supreme Court decision that insulates state legislatures from popular input
or usurpation. Other cases, such as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), involve interferences in the
work of the legislature not by the people, but rather by other branches of government such as the
judiciary. Reading the constitutional references to "legislature" to preclude involvement from the
judiciary or the executive branch is easier than reading them to preclude popular control because
legislatures are created by the people in a way they are not created by other state branches. See
Amar, supra note 13. As Professor Hasen himself notes, the same three Justices who spoke
directly on this issue in Bush v. Gore dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari in Colorado
Gen. Assembly v. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093 (2004) (cert. denied), indicating their discomfort with
state judicial involvement in Congressional district line drawing. But, notably, their dissent from
the denial of certiorari in Salazar intimated that popular, as opposed to judicial, involvement
would be less constitutionally troubling. Hasen, supra note 1, at 618-19.
Moreover, as Professor Hasen also observes, the Court has allowed popular input in other areas of
the Constitution where state "legislatures" are mentioned. For example, in Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355, 367-68 (1932), the Supreme Court in 1932 said that the fact that Article I of the
Constitution directs state "legislatures" to draw congressional district lines (subject to
congressional override) does not prevent a state from involving the state Governor-through his
veto power-in the state lawmaking process used to draw federal district boundaries. Given all
this, close analysis of the Hawke hurdle is justified.
33. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1999); Donovan v. Priest,
931 S.W.2d 119, 125-27 (Ark. 1996); League of Women Voters of Maine v. Gwadosky, 966 F.
Supp. 52, 56-57 (D. Me. 1997).
34.

See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 224-25.
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But appreciating the sequence of events is crucial to understanding what
was at stake and how best to understand the decision.
On December 1, 1917, two-thirds of each house of Congress adopted a
resolution proposing and submitting for ratification what ultimately became
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution: the alcohol prohibition
amendment. 36 An important feature of the resolution was its provision
"that the Amendment should be inoperative unless ratified" by the requisite
number of legislatures of the states "within seven years from the date of...
submission., 37
On January 7, 1919, the Senate and House of
Representatives of Ohio, acting as the General Assembly of the state of
Ohio, adopted a resolution ratifying the proposed prohibition amendment
and mandated that certified copies of the joint resolution of ratification be
forwarded by the governor of Ohio to the United States Secretary of State
and to the presiding officer of each house of Congress.38 On January 27,
39
1919, the Governor of Ohio complied with the legislature's resolution.
Two days later, the Secretary of State of the United States proclaimed that
the Eighteenth Amendment had been ratified, listing Ohio as one of the
thirty-six states having ratified the same.4 °
On March 11, 1919, 4 1 six weeks after the United States Secretary of
State proclaimed ratification, a voter in Ohio filed with defendant Harvey
Smith, the Secretary of State of Ohio, a referendum petition pursuant to
provisions in the Ohio Constitution.42 The petition, which had been signed
by the requisite number of voters, six percent, requested that Mr. Smith
prepare ballot materials for an election to be held by the people of Ohio to
approve or reject the alcohol prohibition amendment to the United States
Constitution.4 3 The 1918 Ohio Constitution "reserve[d] to [the people]
themselves the legislative power of the referendum on the action of the
General Assembly ratifying any proposed amendment to the Constitution

35. See Amar, supra note 13, for a fuller form and discussion of the facts.
36. The Eighteenth Amendment, which was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, see
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, had "prohibit[ed] the manufacture, sale or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes." Hawke,
253 U.S. at 224-25.
37.

Hawke, 253 U.S. at 225.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41.

See Petition in Common Pleas Court, Record at 16; Hawke, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (No.

582).
42.
43.

Petition in Common Pleas Court, supra note 41, Record at 16-17.
Id. at 19.
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of the United States."" By its terms, the Ohio Constitution required that
any legislative ratification not go into effect "until ninety days after it shall
have been adopted by the General Assembly," during which time
signatures could be gathered and a referendum petition could be filed.45
In April of 1919, plaintiff George Hawke brought suit in Ohio county
court to enjoin Smith from expending any State monies in preparing and
printing forms for the referendum ballot, on the ground that such a
referendum under these circumstances would violate federal law.46 The
trial court, the State appellate court, and the Ohio Supreme Court
all
47
rejected this claim, holding that the referendum ballot could proceed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, in effect refusing to permit
the Ohio Constitution's referendum provisions to be implemented on these
facts.48 In doing so, the Court spoke in the broad terms Professor Hasen
quotes,49 essentially saying that a legislature is a legislature, and not the
people.
Yet the Court's broad language here was unnecessary to resolve the
case before it; there was a much easier ground on which to do so, and one
that the Court itself suggested. After explaining that the Ohio referendum
could not proceed, the Court observed: "Any other view might lead to
endless confusion in the manner of ratification of [the] federal
amendments., 50 Now here is a concern that is rooted in the structure and
history of the Constitution itself. And the facts of the case implicate this
concern as powerfully as one could imagine. Let us not forget that by the
time the referendum petition was filed, the Governor of Ohio had already
told the federal authorities that the legislature of Ohio had ratified the
Eighteenth Amendment.51
Indeed, things were worse than that for the Ohio referendum
proponents. The United States Secretary of State had alreadyproclaimed
the validity of the new amendment.52 Did anyone really think the people of
Ohio could reopen the validity of an amendment already proclaimed by the
federal government to be the Supreme Law of the Land? To put the point
another way, by ordering the Governor to communicate ratification-

44. Id.
45. Id.
46.
47.

Id. at 16-21.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224 (1920).

48. Id.
at 231.
49. See Hasen, supra note 1,at 619.
50. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230.
51. See generallyHawke, supra note 26.
52. Id.
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apparently in violation of the ninety day waiting period 53-the Ohio
legislature effectively blocked the State referendum procedure from being
used. A very different case would have been presented, however, had
referendum proponents been able to get into court to enforce the Ohio
Constitution before legislative ratification was communicated to
Washington. Given the way things happened, had the United States
Supreme Court given effect to the referendum provision, an immensely
uncertain situation would have resulted. In some ways then, Hawke can be
understood to be more about the lack of remedies4 for state law breaches
than it was about state law conflict with Article V.1
The Supreme Court acknowledged this two years later, in Leser v.
Garnett,55 when it affirmed the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment over
objections that various states had improperly ratified the Amendment in
violation of state legislative procedures. 56 In dispensing with the challenge,
the Court explicitly relied on the ground that the governors of the states in
57
question had-whether or not they complied with state law in doing so already certified to the federal government, and that certainty required
respect for these certifications.58 This makes perfect sense. How could we
expect federal executive and legislative officials, to whom notice of
certification by states is sent, to arbitrate disputes about what state law
means? One way to understand the reference to "legislatures" in Article V,
then, is to say that their communication to Congress counts as "official."
But this does not mean that Article V prevents state law from coercing state

53. The Governor communicated ratification to the United States Secretary of State twenty
days after the State legislature ratified the Amendment. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text. This apparently violated Ohio's law because the Constitution of Ohio mandated that no
ratification "shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have been adopted by the General
Assembly." Petition in Common Pleas Court, supra note 41, at 19.
54. Cf 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 741 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (observing that "binding"
instructions need not void the vote of faithless agents).
55. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
56. See id. at 137. The plaintiffs in Leser also challenged ratification in some states on the
same ground unsuccessfully urged in Hawke; namely, that violation of state referendum laws
made ratification ineffective. See id. On this point, the Leser Court merely cited Hawke. See id.
57. The Leser Court explained that as long as the "legislatures... had power to adopt the
resolutions of ratification," their having done so was conclusive upon the United States Secretary
of State. Id. Of course, this reasoning really did consider the plaintiff's argument that because
the legislatures in question had violated "rules of legislative procedure," they lacked "power." Id.
In any event, for our purposes, if violation of procedural rules in Leser does not deprive a state
legislature of power, then neither should violation of the referendum provisions at issue in Hawke
and at issue in another part of Leser have deprived the Ohio legislature of its power. Ohio's
certification to the federal government in Hawke, then, is "conclusive" by the reasoning of Leser
without regard to whether Ohio law violated Article V.
58. See id. (relying on Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-73 (1892)).
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legislatures into communicating to the federal government the message that
pleases the people. Courts are fully capable of enforcing this coercion
before the fact59 in ways that avoid confusion and uncertainty. Given all
this, to the extent that Leser adds anything, 60 the light it casts backward on
Hawke might be a narrowing one.61

Conclusion
Given that initiative proponents are not necessarily foreclosed by the
text of the Constitution, or Supreme Court case law, and given that
initiative backers have some nineteenth and twentieth century history on
their side, I think courts should be hesitant to invalidate all initiated
changes to presidential selection procedures.

59. As Professor Hasen rightly notes in the latter part of his article, early rather than later
judicial review is generally preferable in this area of law. Hasen, supra note 1, at 628.
60. The precedential value of Leser is weakened by the fact that, as the Court itself noted,
the states whose ratification was in question were unnecessary to the ultimate ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment inasmuch as enough states had already ratified it. See Leser, 258 U.S. at
137. One could argue that because some of the unchallenged state ratifications took place after
some of the challenged state ratifications, those unchallenged subsequent ratifications may have
been improperly influenced by the earlier "illegal" ratifications being contested in Leser. Perhaps

it is for this reason that the Court went on to discuss the merits of the plaintiffs' claims that
various ratifying states had violated state referendum and state procedural rules.
61. Mike Paulsen has noted this aspect of Leser: "Of course, the state's transmission of its

ratification should be one that federal authorities may take at face value .... (The Court so held
just two years after Hawke, in Leser v. Garnett). It is thus the responsibility of state authorities to
enforce any state law procedural condition subsequent prior to transmittal." Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 732 (1993). Because of the opacity of the Hawke opinion,
however, Professor Paulsen did not realize that Leser narrowed Hawke and at the same time made
its outcome correct. Accordingly, Professor Paulsen suggests that Hawke was "wrongly
decided." See id. at 731 ("On balance .... the [best thing to do] is simply to recognize that
Hawke was wrongly decided."). In a discussion with him, I think I have convinced Professor
Paulsen that Hawke has unnecessary and unpersuasive language but is correct on its facts and
susceptible of a narrower reading consistent with its reference to "confusion."
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